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Abstract 
Models of salience-based choice have become popular in recent years, although there is still no known set 
of simple conditions or axioms which implies the existence of a salience function. In this paper, we 
provide simple and natural axioms that characterize the general class of salience functions. As an 
application we consider a salience-based model of decision making and show that within that setup the 
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes is a general property of a salience function and that the properties 
producing that pattern also account for other anomalies involving risky and intertemporal choice.  
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1. Introduction 
Models of salience-based choice have been developed in recent years for decisions under risk (Bordalo et 
al., 2012), decisions over time (Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013), decisions under uncertainty (Schneider, Leland, 
and Wilcox, 2016), decisions across each of these domains (Leland and Schneider, 2016), and for consumer 
purchase decisions (Bordalo et al., 2013). Each of these approaches typically relies on some notion of a 
‘salience function’. However, there is no axiomatic foundation for such functions. In this paper, we begin 
by proposing three simple axioms to characterize the nature of a qualitative salience relation. Aside from 
basic technical conditions (ordering, continuity, and symmetry), the key requirements are simple 
monotonicity properties which we term monotonicity in intervals, monotonicity in ratios, and monotonicity 
in differences. These properties, in turn, imply salience functions will exhibit Ordering, Decreasing 
Absolute Sensitivity (DAS) and Increasing Proportional Sensitivity (IPS).1 We then show how, in the 
context of the model of "salience weighted utility over presentations" (SWUP) proposed in Leland and 
Schneider (2016), these three properties, individually or in concert, provide a unified explanation for choice 
anomalies across decision domains.  Specifically, we show that under SWUP, DAS is responsible for the 
tendency to be risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses at high and moderate probabilities and to 
appear to discount the future hyperbolically while IPS implies the common ratio effect in risky choice and 
the magnitude effect in intertemporal choice.  In addition, the two properties in concert imply the fourfold 
pattern of risk preferences.  
2.      Axioms for Salience Perception 
The properties of salience perception have typically been justified on intuitive and empirical grounds (e.g., 
Bordalo et al., 2012). Here we show that these properties may also be derived from first principles that one 
might expect to characterize the perceptual system. We consider salience perceptions between pairs of 
quantities (𝑥, 𝑦). These quantities may be pairs of payoffs or probabilities or time delays, for example. 
Denote the set of quantities being compared by a closed and convex set 𝑋 ⊂ ℝ+
2 . Let ⊵𝑠 be a binary relation 
called a salience relation carrying the interpretation “at least as salient as” over pairs in 𝑋, with strictly 
greater salience and equivalence denoted by ⊳𝑠  and ~𝑠. Let  ⊵𝑠 be endowed with the following properties:  
 
 
                                                          
1 The first two of these monotonicity properties also enable us to characterize the entire class of salience functions 
formalized by Bordalo et al. (2013) while the third enables us to discriminate between specific forms of different 
salience functions as it is satisfied by the salience function in Bordalo et al. (2012), but not by the salience function 
in Bordalo et al. (2013). 
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Axiom 1 (ORDERING AND CONTINUITY). ⊵𝑠 is a continuous
2 weak order on 𝑋. 
For 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑥′, 𝑦′ ≥ 0., let ∆(𝑥, 𝑦): = 𝑥 − 𝑦 ≥ 0, and  let 𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦): = 𝑥/𝑦 ≥ 1. Note that our definitions of 
differences, ∆(𝑥, 𝑦), and ratios, 𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦) have, without loss of generality, set 𝑥 ≥ 𝑦.   
Axiom 2  (SYMMETRY). For any (𝑥, 𝑦), (𝑦, 𝑥) ∈ 𝑋, (𝑥, 𝑦) ~𝑠 (𝑦, 𝑥). 
Axiom 3 (MONOTONICITY IN INTERVALS). For any (𝑥, 𝑦), (𝑥′, 𝑦′) ∈ 𝑋, if [𝑦′, 𝑥′] is a strict subset of 
[𝑦, 𝑥] then (𝑥, 𝑦) ⊳𝑠 (𝑥′, 𝑦′). 
Note that if [𝑦′, 𝑥′] is a strict subset of [𝑦, 𝑥], then ∆(𝑥, 𝑦) > ∆(𝑥′, 𝑦′), and 𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑟(𝑥′, 𝑦′). That is, 
(𝑥, 𝑦) has both a larger absolute difference and a larger ratio than (𝑥′, 𝑦′), in which case (𝑥, 𝑦) is more 
salient than (𝑥′, 𝑦′). 
Axiom 4 (MONOTONICITY IN RATIOS). For any (𝑥, 𝑦), (𝑥′, 𝑦′) ∈ 𝑋, if ∆(𝑥, 𝑦) = ∆(𝑥′, 𝑦′) with 𝑥′ > 𝑥,  
𝑦′ > 𝑦, then 𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑟(𝑥′, 𝑦′)  implies (𝑥, 𝑦) ⊳𝑠 (𝑥′, 𝑦′). 
Axiom 4 implies that, for a fixed absolute difference, salience increases with larger ratios.  
Axiom 5 (MONOTONICITY IN DIFFERENCES).  For any (𝑥, 𝑦), (𝑥′, 𝑦′) ∈ 𝑋, if  
𝑟(𝑥′, 𝑦′) = 𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦), where 𝑥′ > 𝑥 and 𝑦′ > 𝑦, then ∆(𝑥′, 𝑦′) > ∆(𝑥, 𝑦) implies (𝑥′, 𝑦′) ⊳𝑠 (𝑥, 𝑦). 
Axiom 5 implies that, for a fixed ratio, salience increases with larger absolute differences.  Axioms 3, 4, 
and 5 constitute our main assumptions about the perceptual system. As the axioms involve only universal 
quantifiers, they should be readily testable in experiments. 
Building on Bordalo et al. (2012, 2013), we provide the following general definition of a salience function3: 
Definition 1 (Salience Function 1): A symmetric and continuous function 𝜎: 𝑋 → ℝ is a salience function 
if it has the following properties: 
1. Ordering. For any (𝑥, 𝑦), (𝑥′, 𝑦′) ∈ 𝑋, if [𝑦′, 𝑥′] ⊂ [𝑦, 𝑥], then σ(𝑥′, 𝑦′) < 𝜎(𝑥, 𝑦).  
2. Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity: σ(. ) exhibits diminishing absolute sensitivity if, for any (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈
𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦 > 0 and any 𝜖 > 0, σ(𝑥 + 𝜖, 𝑦 + 𝜖) < σ(𝑥, 𝑦). 
3. Increasing Proportional Sensitivity:σ(. ) exhibits increasing proportional sensitivity if, for any 
(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦 > 0 and any 𝛼 > 1, σ(𝛼𝑥, 𝛼𝑦) > σ(𝑥, 𝑦). 
                                                          
2 The notion of continuity invoked here is that used in consumer preference theory in economics: The relation ⊵𝑠 is 
continuous if it is preserved under limits. That is, for any sequence of pairs {(𝑥𝑛, 𝑦𝑛)}𝑛=1
∞  with 𝑥𝑛 ⊵𝑠 𝑦
𝑛 for all 𝑛, 
𝑥 = lim
𝑛→∞
𝑥𝑛, and 𝑦 = lim
𝑛→∞
𝑦𝑛 , we have 𝑥 ⊵𝑠 𝑦  (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), Definition 3.C.1). 
3 Bordalo et al did not require increasing proportional sensitivity and that property appears nowhere in their writings 
on salience. However, as the axioms indicate, this property seems to be a natural analog to the others, and is 
assumed elsewhere in the literature, albeit as properties of preferences, by Prelec and Loewenstein (1991).  
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Definition 2: A function 𝜎 represents a salience relation ⊵𝑠 if for all (𝑥, 𝑦), (𝑥
′, 𝑦′) ∈ 𝑋, we have 
(𝑥, 𝑦) ⊵𝑠 (𝑥
′, 𝑦′) if and only if 𝜎(𝑥, 𝑦) ≥ 𝜎(𝑥′, 𝑦′). 
Proposition 1: Under Axioms 1-5, there exists a salience function 𝜎 that represents ⊵𝑠. 
Proposition 2: For any function 𝜎 that represents  ⊵𝑠: 
(i)  𝜎 satisfies ordering if and only if  ⊵𝑠 satisfies Axiom 3. 
(ii)  𝜎 satisfies DAS if and only if  ⊵𝑠 satisfies Axiom 4. 
(iii)  𝜎 satisfies IPS if and only if  ⊵𝑠 satisfies Axiom 5. 
Proofs of our propositions are provided in the Appendix. Proposition 1 implies that fundamental 
quantitative properties of the perceptual system such as ordering, diminishing absolute sensitivity, and 
increasing proportional sensitivity can be formally derived from basic axioms imposed on a qualitative 
salience relation. Moreover, Proposition 2 suggests that any salience function as defined in Definition 1 
must satisfy Axioms 3, 4 and 5.     
Similarity-based models of choice proposed by Tversky (1968), Rubinstein (1988, 2003) and 
Leland (1994, 2002) are precursors to the salience based models mentioned in the introduction.  Viewing 
the salience and the similarity of differences as a continuous spectrum suggests the following definition of 
a similarity function that can be derived from similar axioms:    
Definition 3: A symmetric and continuous function 𝑠: 𝑋 → ℝ is a similarity function if it satisfies 1 - 3: 
1. Ordering. If [𝑥𝑗, 𝑦𝑗] is a subset of [𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖], then  𝑠(𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗) > 𝑠(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖).  
2. Increasing Absolute Similarity: 𝑠 exhibits increasing absolute similarity if, for any 𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖 > 0 and any 
𝜖 > 0, 𝑠(𝑥𝑖 + 𝜖, 𝑦𝑖 + 𝜖) > 𝑠(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖). 
3. Decreasing Proportional Similarity: 𝑠 exhibits decreasing proportional similarity if, for any 𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖 >
0 and any 𝛼 > 1, 𝑠(𝛼𝑥𝑖 , 𝛼𝑦𝑖) < 𝑠(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖). 
Definition 3 implies that two values become more similar as the ratio or absolute difference between them 
declines.  
3.       Application: Salience Weighted Utility over Presentations  
Now consider the salience-based model of Leland and Schneider (2016). Let there be a finite set, 𝑋, of 
outcomes. A lottery is a mapping 𝑝: 𝑋 → [0,1] such that ∑ 𝑝(𝑥) = 1𝑥∈𝑋 . Denote the set of all lotteries by 
∆(𝑋). To represent a lottery, 𝑝, we employ a one-dimensional array, 𝐩, consisting of 𝑛(𝐩) outcomes and 
𝑛(𝐩) corresponding probabilities. Denote the ith outcome in 𝐩 and the ith corresponding probability by xi 
and pi, respectively. Notice that there could be many arrays representing the same lottery.   
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Definition 4 (Representation of a lottery): We say that an array 𝐩 is a representation of lottery 𝑝 if the 
following two properties hold: 
(i) For i =1,2,…,𝑛(𝐩), ∑ 𝐩𝐢𝐢 = 1 
(ii) For all i such that xi = x, ∑ 𝐩𝐢𝐢 = 𝑝(𝑥). 
Note that a representation 𝐩 of lottery 𝑝 differs from the lottery itself since it permits the same outcome to 
appear more than once in the array provided that the corresponding probabilities sum to the overall 
probability of that outcome.  Two representations of different lotteries presented jointly, constitute a frame.   
Definition 5 (Frame for lotteries): A presentation or frame, 𝐅{𝐩, 𝐪} of two lotteries, 𝑝 and 𝑞, is a matrix 
containing a representation, 𝐩 of 𝑝 and a representation, 𝐪 of 𝑞. A visual depiction of a choice presentation 
is given in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. A Choice Presentation for Decisions under Risk 
 
 
 
We consider one-dimensional arrays 𝐩 and 𝐪 which represent lotteries 𝑝 and 𝑞 that offer a finite and equal 
number of outcomes denoted 𝐱𝐢 and 𝐲𝐢, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, where each 𝐱𝐢 occurs with probability, 𝐩𝐢 and each 𝐲𝐢 
occurs with probability 𝐪𝐢. We use bold font for attributes in an array and italicized font for attributes in the 
support of a lottery.  
 Now consider how a decision maker chooses between arrays like p and q.  An extensive body of 
experimental work in both economics and psychology has demonstrated that even small changes in 
presentations can have consequential effects on behavior. Moreover, certain representations of choices lead 
people to make choices that are unambiguously mistakes to the extent they entail preferring less to more. 
That some observed choices may be mistakes suggests we choose based on an evaluation procedure that is 
only imperfectly aligned with our true preferences. To explore this possibility, let there be a preference 
relation, ≻, over ∆(𝑋) reflecting the decision maker’s true preferences and assume these preferences 
conform to   expected utility theory. Then for all lotteries 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ ∆(𝑋),  
(1) 𝑝 ≻ 𝑞 if and only if  ∑ 𝑝(𝑥)𝑈(𝑥) > ∑ 𝑞(𝑦)𝑈(𝑦)𝑦∈𝑋𝑥∈𝑋 . 
To capture the idea that actual choice is based on a judgment related to true preference, we consider a 
second relation ≻̂ over representations of lotteries. The relation ≻̂ may be viewed as a ‘perceptual relation’ 
(rather than a preference relation) which assigns higher rankings to arrays that “look better” given the frame.  
For the general frame in Figure 1, given (1), an unbiased perceptual relation is: 
(2) 𝐩 ≻̂ 𝐪  if and only if  ∑ 𝐩𝐢𝑈(𝐱𝐢) > ∑ 𝐪𝐢𝑈(𝐲𝐢)
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 ,  
 
(x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2)  (xi,yi) (pi,qi)  (xn,yn) (pn,qn) 
p  x1 p1 x2 p2 … xi pi … xn pn 
q  y1 q1 y2 q2 … yi qi … yn qn 
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for all 𝐩, 𝐪, such that 𝐩 is a representation of 𝑝 and 𝐪 is a representation of 𝑞 and for all 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ ∆(𝑋).  
To accommodate the possibility that frames may frustrate the expression of preference, note that 
equations (1) and (2) provide an alternative-based evaluation - one lottery is strictly preferred to another, 
if and only if it yields a greater expected payoff to the decision maker. Building on Leland and Sileo (1998), 
note that the alternative-based evaluation in (2) may be written equivalently as an attribute-based 
evaluation such that  𝐩 ≻̂ 𝐪 if and only if (3) holds: 
(3)    ∑ [(𝐩𝐢 − 𝐪𝐢)(𝑈(𝐱𝐢) + 𝑈(𝐲𝐢))/2 + (𝑈(𝐱𝐢) − 𝑈(𝐲𝐢))(𝐩𝐢 + 𝐪𝐢)/2] > 0.
𝑛
𝑖=1  
The attribute-based evaluation in (3) computes probability differences associated with outcomes weighted 
by the average utility of those outcomes plus utility differences of outcomes weighted by their average 
probability of occurrence. A decision maker who chooses among representations according to the attribute-
based evaluation in (3) will be indistinguishable from one who chooses according to the alternative-based 
evaluation in (2) who, in turn, will be indistinguishable from an agent who chooses according to true 
preferences as in (1). But now suppose that in the process of comparing risky alternatives an agent 
evaluating options according to (3) notices when the payoff in one alternative is “a lot more money” than 
the payoff in another and when one alternative offers “a much better chance” of receiving an outcome than 
the other. In these cases, we will assume that large differences in attribute values across different 
alternatives are perceived as particularly salient or attract disproportionate attention and are overweighted 
in the evaluation process. To capture this intuition that larger differences in attributes are over-weighted or 
attract disproportionate attention, we place salience weights 𝜙(𝐩𝐢, 𝐪𝐢) on probability differences and 
𝜇(𝐱𝐢, 𝐲𝐢) on payoff differences, yielding the following model of salience-weighted evaluation, in which         
𝐩 ≻̂ 𝐪 if and only if (4) holds:  
(4)         ∑ [𝜙(𝐩𝐢, 𝐪𝐢)(𝐩𝐢 − 𝐪𝐢)(𝑈(𝐱𝐢) + 𝑈(𝐲𝐢))/2 +  𝜇(𝐱𝐢, 𝐲𝐢)(𝑈(𝐱𝐢) − 𝑈(𝐲𝐢))(𝐩𝐢 + 𝐪𝐢)/2] > 0.
𝑛
𝑖=1   
Leland and Schneider (2016) refer to model (4) as Salience-Weighted Utility over Presentations 
(SWUP). Note that SWUP has a dual interpretation as a model of salience-based choice that overweights 
large differences or as a model of similarity-based choice that underweights small differences. Note also 
that (3) is clearly a special case of (4) in which all salience weights are equal.   
 
 
 
Figure 2. A Choice Presentation for Consumption Plans 
 
 
 
 
 (x1,y1) (r1,t1) (x2,y2) (r2,t2)  (xi,yi) (ri,ti)  (xn,yn) (rn,tn)  
a x1 r1 x2 r2 … xi ri … xn rn  
b  y1 t1 y2 t2 … yi ti … yn tn  
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Taking an identical series of steps, Leland and Schneider (2016) adapt the model of discounted 
utility to make intertemporal choices between presentations a and b of intertemporal consumption streams 
as shown in Figure 2.  If one chooses a, one will receive payoff x1 in period r1, x2 in period r2 and so forth. 
Similarly, if one chooses b one receives y1 in period t1, y2 in t2 and so forth.  
Let ≻̂𝑡 be a perceptual relation over representations of consumption plans. The intertemporal 
salience-weighted evaluation function analogous to (4) is as follows where 𝐚 ≻̂𝑡 𝐛 if and only if:  
(5)    ∑ [𝜃(𝐫𝐢, 𝐭𝐢)(𝛿
𝐫𝐢 − 𝛿𝐭𝐢)(𝑈(𝐱𝐢
𝑚
𝑖 ) + 𝑈(𝐲𝐢))/2 + 𝜇(𝐱𝐢, 𝐲𝐢) (𝑈(𝐱𝐢) − 𝑈(𝐲𝐢))(𝛿
𝐫𝐢 + 𝛿𝐭𝐢)/2] > 0.   
where 𝜇(𝐱𝐢, 𝐲𝐢) again denotes the salience weight assigned to payoff differences while 𝜃(𝐫𝐢, 𝐭𝐢) denotes the 
salience weight assigned to differences in the timing of intertemporal payoffs. Weights on payoffs again 
reflect the idea that the agent notices when the payoff in one alternative is “a lot more money” than the 
payoff in another while weights of differences in time periods reflect that an agent notices when one 
outcome will be received "a lot sooner" than another.  Large differences on both dimensions are perceived 
as particularly salient and are overweighted in the evaluation process. When the salience weights in (5) are 
all equal, a decision maker who chooses as in (5) will be indistinguishable from one who maximizes the 
discounted utility of intertemporal consumption streams. 
3.1   The Nature of Salience Perceptions 
The salience functions 𝜇,  𝜙,  and 𝜃 determine the only ways in which the behavior of an agent 
who focuses disproportionate attention on large differences, a focal thinker, differs from a rational agent 
who chooses according to expected and discounted utility, respectively. In our analysis, we assume a 
salience function exhibits the properties of the perceptual system in Definition 6 which revises Definition 
1 to account for situations involving negative values (e.g., losses). 
Definition 6 (Salience Function 2): A salience function σ(x, y) is any (non-negative), 
symmetric4 and continuous function that satisfies the following three properties: 
1. Ordering: If [𝐱′, 𝐲′] ⊂ [𝐱, 𝐲] then σ(𝐱′, 𝐲′) < σ(𝐱, 𝐲).  
2. Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity (DAS): σ exhibits diminishing absolute sensitivity if 
(i) For any 𝐱, 𝐲, 𝛜 > 0, σ(𝐱 + 𝛜, 𝐲 + 𝛜) < σ(𝐱, 𝐲). 
(ii) For any 𝐱, 𝐲, 𝛜 < 0, σ(𝐱 + 𝛜, 𝐲 + 𝛜) < σ(𝐱, 𝐲).  
3. Increasing Proportional Sensitivity5 (IPS): σ(. ) exhibits increasing proportional sensitivity 
if for any 𝐱𝐲 > 0 and any 𝛂 > 1, σ(𝛂𝐱, 𝛂𝐲) > σ(𝐱, 𝐲).  
                                                          
4 A function 𝑓(𝐱, 𝐲) is symmetric if 𝑓(𝐱, 𝐲) = 𝑓(𝐲, 𝐱).  
5 The definition of IPS includes product xy > 0 and thus also holds if x and y are both negative. We let the condition 
xy > 0 be replaced with x, y > 0 for functions which are only defined over non-negative values (such as 𝜙 and 𝜃). 
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Under the assumption that salient information is readily discerned from the environment, the 
ordering property is consistent with the “symbolic distance” effect - that it takes adults longer to correctly 
respond to questions regarding which of two numbers is larger, the smaller their arithmetic difference.6   
A long tradition in psychology has studied the sensitivity of the perceptual system to changes in 
the magnitude of a stimulus. Since the Weber-Fechner law was introduced in the 19th century, it has been 
widely recognized that diminishing absolute sensitivity (DAS) is a fundamental property of the perceptual 
system that applies across a range of sensory modalities including tone, brightness, and distance (Stevens, 
1957). Schley and Peters (2014) provide experimental support indicating that a form of diminishing 
sensitivity also characterizes how the brain maps symbolic numbers onto mental magnitudes.  
Support for the assumption that salience perceptions obey increasing proportional sensitivity (IPS) 
can be found in the marketing literature, where IPS is referred to as "the unit effect".7  Pandelaere et al. 
(2011), for example, find that the perceived difference between ratings of 7 and 9 on a 0-10 scale appears 
smaller than the difference between 700 and 900 on a 0-1,000 scale. Similarly, Wertenbroch et al. (2007) 
report that, even when $1 (in US currency) equals S$1.70 in Singapore currency, “a target price of S$1.70 
will appear as less expensive when evaluated against a target budget of S$17.00 than $1 against $10” (p. 
3), indicating that the former difference is perceived as bigger than the latter, as implied by IPS.   
There is also precedent for assuming these or related properties in the decision making literature.  
Diminishing sensitivity is assumed as a property of preferences in both original and cumulative prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In addition, DAS is an analog to the 
property of increasing absolute similarity in Leland (2002) in the context of similarity judgments, and is 
closely related to Scholten and Read’s (2010) diminishing absolute sensitivity assumption for delays and 
outcomes in intertemporal choice. Bordalo et al. (2012) explicitly assume salience perceptions regarding 
payoff differences obey Ordering and DAS while Rosa et al. (1993) considered the implications of both 
DAS and IPS for decisions regarding the introduction of new products. Finally, DAS and IPS are assumed 
in Prelec and Loewenstein's (1991) model of decision making over time although as properties of 
preferences.  In contrast, our approach does not modify the basic ingredients of the rational economic 
models – the utility function and discount factor retain their economic interpretation as measuring risk 
preference and time preference. Instead, these dimensions are weighted by functions that account for the 
perception of differences in risk, time, and money. Our approach thereby integrates models based on 
similarity and salience perceptions (e.g., Rubinstein 1988, 2003; Leland 1994, 2002; Bordalo et al. 2012) 
with the fundamental economic models of preference-based choice.  
                                                          
6 For example, consistent with the ordering property, Moyer and Landauer (1967) found that it takes adults longer to 
answer the question "Which number is larger, 2 or 3?" than to answer the question "Which number is larger, 2 or 7?"  
7 Schley et al (2015) contains a recent summary of this literature.   
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4.    Implications of Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity  
4.1 Risk Aversion (Seeking) for Gains (Losses) at High and Moderate Probabilities 
A simple behavioral definition of commonly observed risk preferences is given in Definition 7: 
Definition 7 (Risk preferences at moderate to high probabilities): Consider the frames in Figure 3 of a 
choice between a representation 𝐩 of a lottery 𝑝 and its expected value, 𝐄(𝐩), where 𝐱 > 𝐲 ≥ 0.  
(i) Risk aversion for gains at moderate to high probabilities holds if 𝐄(𝐩) ≻̂ 𝐩 for all 𝐩𝟏 ∈[0.5,1). 
(ii) Risk seeking for losses at moderate to high probabilities holds if  𝐩′ ≻̂ 𝐄(𝐩′) for all 𝐩𝟏 ∈[0.5,1). 
Figure 3.  Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity and Attitudes toward Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To isolate the role of salience perceptions in governing risk attitudes, we state the following proposition for 
the case where the utility function is linear.  
Proposition 3: Consider the frames in Figure 3 and let 𝑈(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then for all 𝐩𝟏 ∈ [𝟎. 𝟓, 𝟏] a focal thinker 
is risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses if 𝜇 satisfies ordering and DAS. 
For the case where 𝐩
𝟏
= 0.5, Proposition 3 requires only DAS. In conjunction with DAS, ordering 
implies that the result extends to all 𝐩𝟏 ∈ [𝟎. 𝟓, 𝟏]. This stronger result implies that if we observe risk-
seeking for gains or risk aversion for losses, such behavior will occur at low probabilities, consistent with 
the experimental observation of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  
 
4.2 The Common Difference Effect and Hyperbolic Discounting  
        Just as DAS has implications for attitudes toward risk, it also has implications regarding attitudes 
toward delay. To illustrate, consider choices between receiving $100 now (SS) and $120 in one year (LL), 
and between $100 in 10 years (SS′) and $120 in 11 years (LL′). The stationarity axiom of discounted utility 
theory requires choices to be either SS and SS′ or LL and LL′. Strotz (1955) conjectured, and subsequent 
experimental work (as cited in Frederick et al. 2002) has confirmed, that people often choose SS over LL 
but also select LL′ over SS′. Standard models of hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting by 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) and Laibson (1997), respectively, have been proposed for such behavior.   
    Under SWUP, SS is chosen over LL when the salience weight associated with the difference in delays 
(now versus in one year) outweighs the weight associated with the difference in payoffs ($120 versus $100). 
However, as a consequence of diminishing absolute sensitivity, the salience weight associated with the time 
                  Risk Aversion for Gains                                   Risk Seeking for Losses 
 
(i) (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2)     (ii) (x1,y1) (p1,q1)   (x2,y2) (p2,q2)  
𝐄(𝐩) 𝐄(𝐩) 𝐩𝟏 𝐄(𝐩) 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏 𝐄(𝐩
′) 𝐄(𝐩′) 𝐩𝟏 𝐄(𝐩
′) 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏  
𝐩 𝐱 𝐩𝟏 𝐲 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏 𝐩′ −𝐱 𝐩𝟏 −𝐲 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏  
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delays is smaller in the choice between SS′ and LL′ (10 years versus 11 years), making LL′ appear more 
attractive. More formally, consider choices between a smaller sooner (SS) and a larger later (LL) 
consumption plan shown in Figure 4 where 𝑦 > 𝑥 > 0 and 𝑡 > 𝑟 ≥ 0.  
Definition 8 (The Common Difference Effect / Hyperbolic Discounting): The common difference 
effect  holds if 𝐒𝐒 ~̂𝒕 𝐋𝐋 implies 𝐋𝐋′ ≻̂𝒕 𝐒𝐒′.  
Figure 4.  Properties of Time Preferences Predicted by SWUP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Though commonly interpreted as implying that agents discount hyperbolically rather than exponentially 
as required by discounted utility, the following proposition from Leland and Schneider (2016) suggests 
instead that the common difference effect and appearance of hyperbolic discounting occur for the same 
reason people exhibit systematic risk attitudes for gains and losses at high and moderate probabilities.  
Proposition 4 (Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity and Hyperbolic Discounting): A focal thinker 
exhibits hyperbolic discounting in the frames in Figure 4 if and only if  𝜃 satisfies diminishing absolute 
sensitivity.  
5. Implications of Increasing Proportional Sensitivity 
5.1 The General Common Ratio Effect 
One of the oldest examples of anomalous behavior under risk is the common ratio effect. A classic example, 
due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), is that a decision maker indifferent between a 90% chance of $3000 
and 45% chance of $6000 will strictly prefer a 0.1% chance of $6000 over a 0.2% chance of $3000. The 
intuition behind these choices is straightforward. In both instances, the decision maker trades-off the 
difference in payoffs relative to the difference in probabilities of receiving those payoffs. In the first choice, 
the difference between the probabilities (90%-45%) is more salient than the difference in payoffs resulting 
in the choice of the safe option. But by IPS, reducing the probabilities holding their ratio constant, reduced 
the perceived salience of their difference (0.2% -0.1%). As a result, in the second choice, the risky option 
is selected. More formally: 
 
Definition 9 (General Common Ratio Effect): For frames (i) and (ii) in Figure 5, the general common 
ratio effect holds if for all 𝐲 > 𝐱 > 𝟎; 1 ≥ 𝐩
𝟏
> 𝐪
𝟏
> 0 and 𝛂 ∈ (0,1), 𝐩 ~̂ 𝐪, implies 𝐪′ ≻̂ 𝐩′. 
   Simple Consumption Plans       Hyperbolic Discounting                    The Magnitude Effect 
   (i) (x1,y1) Period          (ii) (x1,y1)    Period    (iii) (x1,y1) Period 
  SS 𝒙 𝒓  SS′ 𝑥 𝑟 + ∆  SS′ 𝑘𝑥 𝑟 
 LL 𝑦 𝑡  LL′ 𝒚 𝒕 + ∆  LL′ 𝒌𝒚 𝒕 
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Figure 5.  The General Common Ratio Effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 5:   A focal thinker exhibits the general common ratio effect if and only if 𝜙 satisfies IPS.  
5.2 The Magnitude Effect 
The IPS property similarly influences intertemporal choices.  In addition to requiring stationarity, 
discounted utility theory requires choices be invariant to proportional increases in payoffs. However, Thaler 
(1981) and many others,8 found such increases in payoffs to yield increasing patience – a phenomenon 
called the ‘magnitude effect’ (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991). For example, an individual indifferent 
between $75 today and $100 in one month will choose $1000 in one month over $750 today.  This holds 
under SWUP if the comparison of $750 and $1000 is more salient than that between $75 and $100 (which 
is implied by increasing proportional sensitivity). More formally:  
Definition 10 (Magnitude Effect): Consider frames (i) and (iii) in Figure 4. The magnitude effect holds 
if for all 𝑘 > 1, 𝐒𝐒 ~̂𝒕 𝐋𝐋 implies 𝐋𝐋′ ≻̂𝒕 𝐒𝐒′.  
Proposition 6: A focal thinker exhibits the magnitude effect if and only if 𝜇 satisfies IPS. 
 
6. Implications following from DAS and IPS - the Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes 
As shown above, DAS and ordering have implications for risk preferences at moderate and high 
probabilities. It turns out IPS has implications for attitudes toward risk involving low probability outcomes. 
Consider the frames in Figure 6, where we set 𝐱 > 0, 𝐤 ≥ 𝟐, and 𝐄(𝐩) = 𝐄(𝐪). Frames (i) and (ii) each 
involve a choice between a sure option and a mean-preserving spread. Setting 𝐤 ≥ 2 ensures that the payoff 
with the largest absolute value occurs at low probabilities. For 𝐤 = 2,  we have 𝐩𝟏 = 1/3, independent of 
𝐱, and 𝐩𝟏 decreases toward 0 as 𝐤 increases, holding 𝐱 fixed. In the figure, 𝐩𝟏 is the unique value determined 
by the requirement that 𝐄(𝐩) = 𝐄(𝐪).  For 𝐱 = $1, and 𝐤 = 1,000,000, the choice in frame (i) resembles 
the decision of purchasing a lottery ticket (𝐩𝟏 ~ 0.000001), and the choice in frame (ii) resembles the 
decision to insure against low-likelihood disasters. For such large values of 𝐤 relative to 𝐱, the payoff 𝐱/𝐤 
is essentially 0 and its inclusion may be viewed as merely a technical condition. Thus, for large 𝐤 and small 
𝐱, the frames in Figure 6 approximate a choice between a lottery with one non-zero outcome occurring with 
probability 𝐩𝟏, and its expected value. Formally, we have the following definition:  
                                                          
8 For an extensive discussion of the literature pertaining to the magnitude effect, see Read (2003). 
 (i) (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2)   (ii) (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2) 
𝐩 𝐱 𝐩𝟏  𝟎 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏  𝐩′ 𝐱 𝛂𝐩𝟏  𝟎 𝟏 − 𝛂𝐩𝟏  
𝐪 𝐲 𝐪𝟏  𝟎 𝟏 − 𝐪𝟏  𝐪′ 𝐲 𝛂𝐪𝟏  𝟎 𝟏 − 𝛂𝐪𝟏  
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Definition 11 (Risk Preference at low probabilities): Consider frames (i) and (ii) in Figure 6, where 
𝐱 > 0, 𝐤 ≥ 2, and 𝐄(𝐩) = 𝐄(𝐪):  
(i) Risk-seeking for gains at low probabilities holds if 𝐪 ≻̂ 𝐩.                  
(ii) Risk aversion for losses at low probabilities holds if 𝐩′ ≻̂ 𝐪′ 
Figure 6.  Increasing Proportional Sensitivity and Attitudes toward Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 7: Let 𝑈(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then for frames (i) and (ii) in Figure 3, a focal thinker is risk-seeking for 
gains at low probabilities and risk-averse for losses at low-probabilities if 𝜇 satisfies IPS. 
A general implication of Propositions 3 and 7 is that Ordering, DAS and IPS directly imply the 
fourfold pattern of risk preferences without any parametric assumptions about the salience functions. A 
decision maker who exhibits the fourfold pattern displays “risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses 
of high probability and risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low probability” (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992, p. 297). A characteristic example is given in Figure 7. In the figure, note that risk aversion 
in Frame (i) and risk-seeking behavior in Frame (ii) are directly implied by Proposition 3, while risk-seeking 
in Frame (iii) and risk aversion in Frame (iv) are directly implied by Proposition 7.  
   Figure 7.  Ordering, DAS, IPS and the Fourfold Pattern of Risk Preferences* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Probabilities are rounded to the nearest hundredth of the exact values necessary to make the expected values equal. 
                                                                     Lottery Purchase                                               Insurance  Purchase          
 
 
(i) (x1,y1)   (p1,q1)    (x2,y2)     (p2,q2)   (ii) (x1,y1) (p1,q1)  (x2,y2) (p2,q2)  
𝐩 𝐱 𝐩𝟏  𝐱 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏  𝐩′ −𝐱 𝐩𝟏  −𝐱 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏   
𝐪 𝐤𝐱 𝐩𝟏  𝐱/𝐤 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏  𝐪′ −𝐤𝐱 𝐩𝟏  −𝐱/𝐤 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏   
Risk Aversion for high-probability Gains      Risk Seeking for high-probability Losses 
(i) (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2)      (ii) (x1,y1) (p1,q1)   (x2,y2) (p2,q2)  
𝐩 𝟗𝟗 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗 𝟗𝟗 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏        P −99 0.99 −99 0.01  
Q 100 0.99 0.01 0.01        𝐪 −𝟏𝟎𝟎 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗 −𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏  
 
 
 
Risk Seeking for low-probability Gains          Risk Aversion for low-probability Losses             
 
(iii) (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2)   (iv) (x1,y1) (p1,q1)   (x2,y2) (p2,q2)  
p 1 0.01 1 0.99 𝐩 −𝟏 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 −𝟏 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗  
𝐪 𝟏𝟎𝟎 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗 Q −100 0.01 −0.01 0.99  
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Definition 12 (Fourfold pattern): An agent who is risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses at high 
probabilities, as defined in Definition 7, and is risk-seeking for gains and risk-averse for losses at low 
probabilities, as in Definition 11, exhibits the fourfold pattern of risk preferences.   
        Since a salience function in Definition 6 obeys ordering, DAS, and IPS, we have the following, which 
establishes that the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes is a general property of a salience function.    
Corollary 1. (Fourfold Pattern of Risk Preferences): Let 𝑈(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then a focal thinker exhibits the 
fourfold pattern for any salience function 𝜇. 
Although the fourfold pattern is explained by some well-known decision models like prospect theory  
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 
1982), these models have focused on describing the phenomenon as opposed to explaining why it occurs 
(but see Mallpress et al., 2015).  Bordalo et al. (2012) discuss the fourfold pattern as arising in their theory 
of salience-based risky choice. However, the interaction of ordering and DAS in generating the pattern is 
not clearly specified and the IPS property is not discussed at all. Instead, the pattern is explained by positing 
the following salience function involving a parameter 𝜃 > 0 which is difficult to interpret intuitively. 
𝜎(𝐱, 𝐲) =
|𝐱 − 𝐲|
|𝐱| + |𝐲| + 𝜃
,      
In contrast, the approach outlined in the previous section provides a psychological basis for the 
fourfold pattern as a very general implication of a salience function and one that does not rely on any 
specific functional form.  Instead its main properties – ordering, DAS and IPS - follow a logic that one 
might assume as a first principle. As shown in Proposition 1, DAS can be derived from the property that, 
for a fixed absolute difference, the perceptual system is more sensitive to larger ratios. Similarly, IPS can 
be derived from the property that, for a fixed ratio, the perceptual system is more sensitive to larger absolute 
differences. The ordering property is also closely related to DAS and IPS in that if one interval is contained 
in another, the endpoints of the larger interval have both a larger absolute difference and a larger ratio than 
those of the smaller interval and are therefore more salient. 
 
 
7. Discussion 
After providing simple and natural axioms for a general class of salience functions, we considered the 
implications of properties of these functions in the context of risky and intertemporal choice. Table 1 
summarizes properties of observed preferences which can be formally derived from DAS, IPS, and 
Ordering, without any parametric assumptions regarding the salience functions. In 4.1 and 4.2 we showed 
that risk aversion (seeking) for gains (losses) of moderate probability as well as the common difference 
effect and apparent hyperbolic discounting in intertemporal choice arise because the perception of 
differences exhibits diminishing absolute sensitivity embodied in the Weber-Fechner law (e.g., the 
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perceived difference of 100 and 1 is larger than that between 200 and 101).  Leland and Schneider (2016) 
show that DAS also implies ambiguity aversion in Ellsberg’s (1961) paradoxes while Schneider, Leland, 
and Wilcox (2016) present experimental evidence that Ellsberg-type behavior can be reduced by employing 
lottery presentations that preclude DAS from differentially influencing the decision made in one situation 
versus another. 
Table 1: Properties of Preferences Derived from Properties of Perception 
 
Properties of Salience Perception                           
 
Properties of Preferences 
 
Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity 
 
Risk Aversion (Gains) / Risk Seeking (Losses)  
 
Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity 
 
Common Difference Effect / Hyperbolic Discounting  
 
Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity 
 
Ambiguity Aversion  
 
Increasing Proportional Sensitivity 
 
Lottery and Insurance Purchase 
 
Increasing Proportional Sensitivity 
 
Common Ratio Effect 
 
Increasing Proportional Sensitivity 
 
Magnitude Effect 
 
Ordering, DAS, IPS 
 
Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes 
 
We subsequently showed that the common ratio effect, the magnitude effect, and the simultaneous purchase 
of lottery tickets and insurance all arise because the perception of magnitude differences exhibits increasing 
proportional sensitivity (e.g., the perceived difference between 200 and 100 is more salient than the 
perceived difference between 2 and 1). Finally, we showed that diminishing absolute sensitivity, increasing 
proportional sensitivity, and ordering interact to produce the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes.  
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Appendix 
Proposition 1: Under Axioms 1-5, there exists a salience function 𝜎 that represents ⊵𝑠. 
Proof: In this proposition, we establish that Axioms 1 through 5 are sufficient for the representation. Axiom 
1, well known in consumer theory, guarantees the existence (see, for instance Mas-Colell, Whinston, and 
Green (1995), Ch. 3, Proposition 3.C.1) of a continuous function 𝜎: 𝑋 → ℝ such that (𝑥, 𝑦) ⊵𝑠 (𝑥
′, 𝑦′) ⟺
𝜎(𝑥, 𝑦) ≥ 𝜎(𝑥′, 𝑦′). Given Axiom 1, it is clear that Axiom 2 implies that 𝜎 is symmetric, and that Axiom 
3 implies that 𝜎 satisfies ordering.  To show that in the presence of Axiom 1, Axiom 4 implies diminishing 
absolute sensitivity, we can write 𝑥′ = 𝑥 + 𝜖 and 𝑦′ = 𝑦 + 𝜖 for 𝜖 > 0. Then we have the following lemma: 
 Lemma 1: 𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑟(𝑥 + 𝜖, 𝑦 + 𝜖) for all 𝑥 > 𝑦 > 0, and any 𝜖 > 0. 
Proof:  Inequality 𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑟(𝑥 + 𝜖 , 𝑦 + 𝜖) holds for all 𝑥 > 𝑦 > 0 and any 𝜖 > 0 if  
𝑥(𝑦 + 𝜖)
𝑦(𝑦 + 𝜖)
>
𝑦(𝑥 + 𝜖)
𝑦(𝑦 + 𝜖)
. 
which requires 𝑥𝑦3 + 2𝑥𝑦2𝜖 + 𝑥𝑦𝜖2 > 𝑥𝑦3 + 𝑥𝑦2𝜖 + 𝑦3𝜖 + 𝑦2𝜖2. Since 𝑥 > 𝑦, we have 
2𝑥𝑦2𝜖 > 𝑥𝑦2𝜖 + 𝑦3𝜖 and 𝑥𝑦𝜖2 > 𝑦2𝜖2. Thus, 𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑟(𝑥 + 𝜖, 𝑦 + 𝜖) = 𝑟(𝑥′, 𝑦′).∎ 
By Axiom 4, the inequality 𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑟(𝑥′, 𝑦′) implies (𝑥, 𝑦) ⊳𝑠 (𝑥′, 𝑦′) which, in the presence of Axiom 
1, implies σ(𝑥, 𝑦) > σ(𝑥 + 𝜖, 𝑦 + 𝜖).  
To show that in the presence of Axiom 1, Axiom 5 implies increasing proportional sensitivity, we 
can write 𝑥′ = 𝛼𝑥 and 𝑦′ = 𝛼𝑦 for 𝛼 > 1.  Note that for any 𝛼 > 1, we have 
∆(𝑥′, 𝑦′) = 𝛼 ∙ ∆(𝑥, 𝑦) > ∆(𝑥, 𝑦). By Axiom 5, ∆(𝑥′, 𝑦′) > ∆(𝑥, 𝑦) implies(𝑥′, 𝑦′) ⊳𝑠 (𝑥, 𝑦) which, by 
Axiom 1, implies σ(𝛼𝑥, 𝛼𝑦) > σ(𝑥, 𝑦). ∎ 
Proposition 2: For any salience function 𝜎 that represents  ⊵𝑠: 
(i)  𝜎 satisfies ordering if and only if  ⊵𝑠 satisfies Axiom 3. 
(ii)  𝜎 satisfies DAS if and only if  ⊵𝑠 satisfies Axiom 4. 
(iii)  𝜎 satisfies IPS if and only if  ⊵𝑠 satisfies Axiom 5. 
Proof: That Axioms 3, 4 and 5 are sufficient for ordering, DAS, and IPS, respectively was confirmed in 
Proposition 1. It remains for us to show that Axioms 3, 4 and 5 necessarily follow from the properties of a 
salience function. It is clear that Axiom 3 is implied by ordering. To see that DAS implies Axiom 4, recall 
that by Lemma 1, 𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑟(𝑥 + 𝜖 , 𝑦 + 𝜖) for any 𝑥, 𝑦 > 0 and any 𝜖 > 0. Also, note that ∆(𝑥, 𝑦) =
∆(𝑥 + 𝜖 , 𝑦 + 𝜖). By DAS, σ(𝑥, 𝑦) > σ(𝑥 + 𝜖, 𝑦 + 𝜖) which implies (𝑥, 𝑦) ⊳𝑠 (𝑥 + 𝜖, 𝑦 + 𝜖) for any 𝜎 that 
represents ⊵𝑠. Thus, we have ∆(𝑥, 𝑦) = ∆(𝑥 + 𝜖 , 𝑦 + 𝜖), and 𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑟(𝑥 + 𝜖 , 𝑦 + 𝜖) which, by DAS, 
imply (𝑥, 𝑦) ⊳𝑠 (𝑥 + 𝜖, 𝑦 + 𝜖) and Axiom 4 follows.  
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To see that IPS implies Axiom 5, recall that ∆(𝑥′, 𝑦′) = 𝛼 ∙ ∆(𝑥, 𝑦) > ∆(𝑥, 𝑦) for any 𝑥, 𝑦 > 0 and 
any 𝛼 > 1. Also note that 𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑟(𝛼𝑥, 𝛼𝑦). By IPS, σ(𝛼𝑥, 𝛼𝑦) > σ(𝑥, 𝑦) which implies 
(𝛼𝑥, 𝛼𝑦) ⊳𝑠 (𝑥, 𝑦) for any 𝜎 that represents ⊵𝑠. Thus, we have 𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑟(𝛼𝑥, 𝛼𝑦), and ∆(𝛼𝑥, 𝛼𝑦) >
∆(𝑥, 𝑦), which, by IPS, imply (𝛼𝑥, 𝛼𝑦) ⊳𝑠 (𝑥, 𝑦) and Axiom 5 follows. ∎ 
Proposition 3 (Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity and Risk Preference): Consider choices as framed in 
Figure 2 and let 𝑈(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then for all  𝐩
𝟏
∈ [0.5,1] a focal thinker is risk-averse for gains and risk-
seeking for losses at moderate to high probabilities if 𝜇 satisfies ordering and DAS. 
Proof: For 𝑈(𝐱) = 𝐱, a focal thinker chooses 𝐄(𝐩) over 𝐩 iff 𝜇(𝐲, (𝐱 − 𝐲)𝐩
𝟏
+ 𝐲) > 𝜇(𝐱, (𝐱 − 𝐲)𝐩
𝟏
+ 𝐲). 
For 𝑝 = 0.5, DAS implies 𝜇(𝐲, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲))  > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)). To see that DAS implies that this 
inequality holds, let 𝛜 = 0.5(𝑥 − 𝑦). Then 𝜇(𝐲 + 𝛜, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲) + 𝛜) = 𝜇(𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲), 𝐱), which by 
symmetry, equals 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)). For 𝐩𝟏 ∈ [0.5,1], note that [𝐱, 𝐱𝐩𝟏 + 𝐲(𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏)] ⊆ [𝐱, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)] 
and thus ordering implies 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)) ≥ 𝜇 (𝐱, 𝐱𝐩
𝟏
+ 𝐲(𝟏 − 𝐩
𝟏
)). Thus, 𝜇(𝐲, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)) >
 𝜇 (𝐱, 𝐱𝐩 + 𝐲(𝟏 − 𝐩
𝟏
)) for all 𝐩𝟏 ∈ [0.5,1]. The result for losses follows analogously. ∎ 
Proposition 5: A focal thinker exhibits the general common ratio effect if and only if 𝜙 satisfies IPS.  
Proof: Note that  𝐩 ~̂ 𝐪 under SWUP if and only if  
𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲)(𝑈(𝐲) − 𝑈(𝐱)) [
𝐩
𝟏
+ 𝐪
𝟏
2
] = 𝜙(𝐩
𝟏
, 𝐪
𝟏
)(𝐩
𝟏
− 𝐪
𝟏
) [
𝑈(𝐲) + 𝑈(𝐱)
2
]. 
Also note that 𝐪′ ≻̂ 𝐩′  if and only if  
   𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲)(𝑈(𝐲) − 𝑈(𝐱)) [
𝐩
𝟏
+ 𝐪
𝟏
2
] > 𝜙(𝛂𝐩
𝟏
, 𝛂𝐪
𝟏
)(𝐩
𝟏
− 𝐪
𝟏
) [
𝑈(𝐲) + 𝑈(𝐱)
2
]. 
By IPS, scaling 𝛂𝐩
𝟏
 and 𝛂𝐪
𝟏
 each by 
1
𝛂
 leads to 𝜙(𝛂𝐩
𝟏
, 𝛂𝐪
𝟏
) < 𝜙(𝐩
𝟏
, 𝐪
𝟏
) for all 𝛂 ∈ (0,1). Letting 𝐤 ≡
1/𝛂, the common ratio effect holds if and only if  (𝛂𝐩
𝟏
, 𝛂𝐪
𝟏
) < 𝜙(𝐤𝛂𝐩
𝟏
, 𝐤𝛂𝐪
𝟏
) for all 𝐤 > 1. ∎ 
Proposition 6: A focal thinker exhibits the magnitude effect if and only if 𝜇 satisfies IPS.  
Proof: For the choice between 𝑆𝑆 and 𝐿𝐿, 𝑆𝑆 ~̂𝑡 𝐿𝐿 under SWUP if and only if  
    𝜇(𝑥, 𝑦)(𝑈(𝑦) − 𝑈(𝑥)) [
𝛿𝑟 + 𝛿𝑡
2
] = 𝜋(𝑟, 𝑡)(𝛿𝑟 − 𝛿𝑡) [
𝑈(𝑦) + 𝑈(𝑥)
2
] 
For the choice between 𝑆𝑆′ and 𝐿𝐿′, 𝐿𝐿′ ≻̂𝑡 𝑆𝑆′ if and only if  
𝜇(𝑘𝑥, 𝑘𝑦)(𝑈(𝑦) − 𝑈(𝑥)) [
𝛿𝑟 + 𝛿𝑡
2
] > 𝜋(𝑟, 𝑡)(𝛿𝑟 − 𝛿𝑡) [
𝑈(𝑦) + 𝑈(𝑥)
2
] 
Given 𝑆𝑆 ~̂𝑡 𝐿𝐿, the magnitude effect holds if and only if 𝜇(𝑘𝑥, 𝑘𝑦) > 𝜇(𝑥, 𝑦) for all 𝑘 > 1,  which holds 
if and only if  𝜇 satisfies IPS. ∎ 
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Proposition 7 (Increasing Proportional Sensitivity and Risk Preference):  If U(x) = x, a focal thinker is 
risk-seeking for low-probability gains and risk-averse for low-probability losses if 𝜇 satisfies IPS.  
Proof: We show that IPS implies risk-seeking for low-probability gains. Risk aversion for low probability 
losses follows analogously. Given 𝑈(𝑥) = 𝑥, a focal thinker strictly prefers 𝑔 to 𝑓 if and only if  
𝜇(𝑥, 𝑘𝑥)(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑘)𝑝 + 𝜇 (𝑥,
𝑥
𝑘
) (𝑥 −
𝑥
𝑘
) (1 − 𝑝) < 0. Since 𝐸(𝑓) = 𝐸(𝑔), we have: 𝑝 =
1−(1/𝑘)
𝑘−(1/𝑘)
. 
Thus, 𝑔 is strictly preferred to 𝑓 if and only if   
𝜇(𝑥, 𝑘𝑥)(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑘) [
1 − (1/𝑘)
𝑘 − (1/𝑘)
] + 𝜇(𝑥, 𝑥/𝑘)(𝑥 − 𝑥/𝑘) [
𝑘 − 1
𝑘 − (1/𝑘)
] < 0, 
which can be rewritten as  𝜇(𝑥, 𝑥/𝑘)𝑥 [
(𝑘−1)(1−(1/𝑘)
𝑘−(1/𝑘)
] < 𝜇(𝑥, 𝑘𝑥)𝑥 [
(𝑘−1)(1−(1/𝑘))
𝑘−(1/𝑘)
], which implies 
𝜇(𝑥, 𝑥/𝑘) < 𝜇(𝑥, 𝑘𝑥). Then by symmetry and increasing proportional sensitivity, we have          
𝜇(𝑥, 𝑘𝑥) = 𝜇(𝑘𝑥, 𝑥) = 𝜇 (𝑘𝑥, 𝑘 (
𝑥
𝑘
)) > 𝜇 (𝑥,
𝑥
𝑘
). The result for losses follows analogously. ∎ 
Corollary 1. (Fourfold Pattern of Risk Preferences): Let 𝑈(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then a focal thinker exhibits the 
fourfold pattern for any salience function 𝜇. 
Proof: By Proposition 3, ordering and DAS imply risk aversion for high probability gains and risk seeking 
behavior for high-probability losses. By Proposition 7, IPS implies risk seeking for low probability gains 
and risk aversion for low probability losses.  
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